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DIVERSITY: THE EMERGING MODERN SEPARATE BUT
EQUAL DOCTRINE
ROBERT N. DAvIs*
A cult of ethnicity has arisen both among non-Anglo whites
and among nonwhite minorities to denounce the idea of a
melting pot, to challenge the concept of "one people," and to
protect, promote, and perpetuate separate ethnic and racial
communities.
The eruption of ethnicity had many good consequences. The
American culture began at last to give shamefully overdue
recognition to the achievements of minorities- subordinated and
spurned during the high noon of Anglo dominance. American
education began at last to acknowledge the existence and
significance of the great swirling world beyond Europe. All
this was to the good. Of course history should be taught from
a variety of perspectives. Let our children try to imagine the
arrival of Columbus from the viewpoint of those who met him
as well as from those who sent him. Living on a shrinking
planet, aspiring to global leadership, Americans must learn
much more about other races, other cultures, other continents.
As they do, they acquire a more complex and invigorating
sense of the world-and of themselves.'
Wednesday, October 12, 1977, is a day I will always remember.
I was in my third year of law school at Georgetown and oral
arguments in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2
were scheduled for that morning.
The line started forming on Tuesday evening and I joined it
after I had eaten supper. When I arrived at the front of the
Supreme Court building, other students had already taken their
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places at the bottom of the steps leading up to the front doors.
The Supreme Court police did not allow any of us on the steps
until the doors were opened the next morning. The fall season
was upon us and Tuesday evening was quite chilly. Wednesday
morning came ever so slowly as we waited in the cold fall evening
and early morning hours. Finally, there was a stir at the front
of the line which had grown by then to over three-hundred people.
The front doors to the Supreme Court were opened and all of a
sudden there was a rush to the steps rather than a calm proces-
sion. The police officers had to restrain the crowd pushing to get
in. They were in the dubious position of making random selections
on a first come first served basis without any idea of who had
been there all night because by now there was no line, but only
a large crowd of people all pushing forward. I managed to get
the attention of one guard who allowed me to enter the court-
room. I was in and I breathed a sigh of relief. I would indeed
hear the oral arguments.
This was a very important case to me because it addressed
issues that touched on my very ability to be in Washington, D.C.,
as a law student at precisely that moment in time. The central
issue was whether race could be used as .a factor in graduate
school admissions decisions. The question was a perplexing one
for any fair-minded person. The Constitution, I had learned,
should be colorblind, yet I was concerned that the Supreme Court
might take the position that race was inappropriate to consider
in the educational admissions process. In my own mind, I justified
the use of race, or more particularly, a disadvantaged background,
as a method of ensuring a diverse student population. Given my
world perspective, I thought it a good idea to bring a variety of
people together from different socio-economic and ethnic back-
grounds and from different parts of the country and the world
to study and learn together. This, I thought, was a healthy
perspective and evidenced an appreciation for the different cul-
tures of the world.8
3. The question of affirmative action, however, and the use of race as a compensatory
factor perplexed me. I did not want to belittle any of my accomplishments because I
happened to be black. I did not want to think that I was admitted to law school because
of my minority status. I have always wanted to stand on my merits. Yet, I realized that
part of the reason I was accepted was because I had met a variety of qualifications that
warranted my admission. Part of the reason I was accepted to law school was because
of my minority status, and part of the reason I was accepted was because I grew up in
Iowa. It is very difficult to explain the internal conflict produced when you know other
majority individuals look at you and think, "affirmative action product, he doesn't quite
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Until recently I had been fairly comfortable with this approach.
The diversity movement of the 1960s and 1970s was very differ-
ent from the diversity movement of today. The word "diversity"
of the Bakke era signified positive unifying concepts. The word
"diversity" today is troubling because it sometimes means sepa-
ration.4 Where diversity ultimately will take us is uncertain given
its evolution.6
This article is about diversity, its evolution from the Bakke
case, and its future in this society. Recent Supreme Court and
appellate court decisions have made it possible for publicly fi-
nanced separate-sex institutions to comply with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the United States Constitution. These same
decisions have expressly opened the door for judicial remedies
that may sanction the existence of racially identifiable institutions
in the name of diversity. Although the courts have not necessarily
encouraged the specific results of this new "diversity," they have,
through judicial opinion, condoned what I call an emerging mod-
ern separate but equal doctrine. This emerging doctrine operates
under the guise of diversity, but harkens back to the days of
Plessy v. Ferguson6 when separate but equal was the law of the
land.
In many ways, this emerging doctrine is in fact an attempt to
accommodate differences. I am troubled, however, by its accen-
tuation of those differences. I think this judicial tendency toward
separate but equal is not purposeful at all, but is the result of
societal evolution. Moreover, this trend results from the judici-
ary's acceptance of the concept of diversity without a full ex-
amination of its benefits and burdens. Thus, I caution the courts
to examine more completely the advantages and disadvantages
of this new diversity movement and the direction in which it
measure up." Part of this reaction is based on a false assumption that the only relevant
qualifications are grade point averages and law school admission test scores. These
barometers tell only part of the story but do not provide the complete picture of whether
a candidate will successfully complete law school.
4. See Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1105 (1992). Professor Carrington
emphasizes this definitional metamorphosis in his article. He notes that the diversity
movement afoot today is something quite different from what Justice Powell had in mind
in Bakke. Moreover, he suggests that the compensation idea of diversity is harmful
because it is fundamentally separatist. Id at 1164.
5. Diversity is defined as "a point or respect in which things differ:' AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 385 (William Morris ed., 2d college ed. 1982).
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that an act requiring white and black persons to be
furnished with separate accommodations on railway trains does not violate the 13th
Amendment), overuled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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could lead, lest we revive old skeletons that none of us would
like to see again.
In recent decisions, the courts have countenanced language
that encourages the development of separate institutions in the
name of diversity.7 This modern interpretation of diversity began
with the dissent of Justices Powell and Rehnquist in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan,8 and has been building steam
ever since.
Part I of this article discusses diversity as it was used in
DeFunis v. Odegaard9 and Bakke. Part II discusses the transitional
case of Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan. Part III
discusses the more recent decisions like United States v. Com-
monwealth of Virginia0 and United States v. Fordice.11 Part IV,
the conclusion, suggests that the Supreme Court should, in the
future, take care to close this door left ajar, or risk sanctioning
a modern separate but equal doctrine in the name of diversity.
I suggest that the Court needs to examine this issue of diversity
much more carefully lest it perform its judicial function by
accepting generalizations that impermissibly equate sex and race
with stereotypes about thought and behavior.12 This judicial ten-
dency to condone racial and sex "essentialism" is ill-advised.13
I. DIVERSITY IN THE EARLY DAYS
The 1960s and 1970s were a period when our country was
grappling with many social issues. Race relations were at the
forefront of the debate. The federal government responded to
some of the social turmoil by taking an active role in "ending
7. See, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992); United States v.
Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992). cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
8. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
9. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
10. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
11. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
12. See Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of
Diversity, 1993 Wis. L. Rav. 105.
13. Id. at 123. Professor Fostei defines "essentialism" "as the notion that a person's
difference determines her essential nature, governing the way a person feels, thinks, and
acts." Id at 139. Thus, the notion of a black experience and a female experience carries
with it the incorrect assumption that blacks and females may react a certain way because
of their "experiences." This assumption is ill founded and simply does not recognize the
individuality of experience. True diversity recognizes that a black person from Iowa may
not think and feel the same way about issues as a black person from Mississippi, or that
two black people from Iowa may not think the same way about the Democratic or
Republican party.
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racial discrimination and segregation in housing, employment and
education." 14 Additionally, federal, state, and local governments
actively promoted programs "aimed at increasing opportunities
for blacks, women, ind other minorities in higher education and
employment."15
Affirmative action was as controversial then as it is now.
Supporters claimed that affirmative action was necessary to
remedy the effects of past discrimination' 6 Opponents argued
that suchprograms stigmatized blacks and disadvantaged whites.17
At issue were seats in law and medical schools, government
employment opportunities at the federal, state, and local levels,
and government contract awards. 8
A. DeFunis v. Odegaard
The affirmative action debate became ripe for judicial inter-
vention in a 1971 case involving Marco DeFunis, a white applicant
to the University of Washington Law School.19 The law school
denied DeFunis admission even though his index average was
higher than thirty-six minority applicants who were admitted.20
DeFunis filed suit in Washington state court contending that the
law school admissions process discriminated against him because
of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.21 The trial court agreed with DeFunis
and issued an injunction requiring the law school to admit him
to the 1971 entering class.P
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
held that "the Law School admissions policy did not violate the
14. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 1340 (1991).
15. Id. at 1343.
16. Id.; see also Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affir-
mative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1327 (1986) (contending that affirmative action
should generally be retained as a tool of public policy because, on balance, it is useful in
overcoming entrenched racial hierarchy).
17. Kennedy, supra note 16, at 1329-37. For a critical assessment of compensatory
affirmative action, see Carrington, supra note 4.
18. Carrington, supra note 4, at 1344.
19. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). For a thoughtful discussion of benign
racial preference pre-Bakke, see Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of Benign Racial
Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 559 (1975).
20. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 324. The admissions process included a review of the index
score of each applicant. Id. at 321. The index score is a product of a formula that combines
the applicant's Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score and grade point average.
21. Id. at 314.
22. Id.
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Constitution."2 DeFunis was a second year law student when he
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The
judgment of the Washington Supreme Court was stayed pending
the final disposition by the United States. Supreme Court.25
DeFunis was in his last year of law school when the Supreme
Court considered this case.
The Supreme Court, in a bare 5-4 majority, held that the case
was moot because the law school would allow DeFunis to complete
his third year of law school regardless of "any decision this Court
might reach on the merits."' 6 Thus, the Burger Court avoided
deciding one of the most controversial constitutional issues of
the day.27 Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent in which he
recommended abolition of the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT)
in favor of a test that considers an applicant's cultural back-
ground, perception, analytical skills, and ability to succeed in law
school.2 Douglas, however, was not supportive of quotas.2
Justice Douglas' views in this area are complex. Although he
discouraged quotas per se, he also reasoned that the law school
"acted properly ... in setting minority applications apart for sep-
arate processing."80 Justice Douglas justified the law school's
separate consideration of minority applicants by reasoning that
the cultural backgrounds of minorities are vastly different from
the dominant Caucasian culture. 1 Thus, according to Justice
Douglas, the University of Washington Law School's admissions
process, which compared minority candidates only to other mi-
nority candidates, was permissible.32 Stephen L. Carter, a Yale
law professor, refers to this policy as an example of "the best
23. Id. at 315.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 319.
27. Id.; see HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 292 (1985) (discussing political
history of appointments to the United States Supreme Court).
28. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 340 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a series of articles ques-
tioning the value of graduate school admissions tests, see Katherine Connor & Ellen J.
Vargyas, The Legal Implications of Gender Bias in Standardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 13 (1992); Robert R. Ramsey, Jr., Law School Admissions: Science, Art, or
Hunch?, 12 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503 (1960); Sanford J. Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal
Education: Special Programs for Law Students Who Are Not Admissible by Traditional
Criteria, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 321 (1970); John H. Wigmore, Juristic Psychopoyemetrology-
or, How to Find Out Whether a Boy Has the Makings of a Lawyer, 24 U. ILL. L. REv. 454,
463 (1929-30).
29. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 340 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 323 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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black" syndrome.3 In Professor Carter's view, this genre of
program suggests that blacks' performance does not measure up
to whites' and therefore blacks should be compared only to other
blacks.
Justice Douglas' dissent is perplexing, for although it recog-
nized that the use of race in the admissions process was prob-
lematic,35 it also supported the use of separate classifications for
Indians, blacks, and Chicanos. The classifications were necessary,
Douglas asserted, because otherwise, these groups might run the
risk of being eliminated from consideration precisely because of
their cultural differences. 9 Justice Douglas recognized this risk
by agreeing that standardized tests such as the LSAT are cul-
turally biased against minorities.7 He did not suggest that the
school prefer any race, only that it consider all applications in a
race neutral fashion.3 Therefore, any test that does not factor
out cultural bias perpetuates a harm to minority cultures to the
benefit of the dominant culture.
In DeFunis, diversity meant developing an admissions program
at the University of Washington Law School that had a goal of
achieving a 'reasonable representation' of minority groups.","
Justice Douglas stated, "[t]he purpose of the University of Wash-
ington cannot be to produce black lawyers for blacks, Polish
lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for
Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers for Americans .... "10
The goal of diversity was not to separate on the basis of race,
religion, gender, or national origin, but to bring together indivi-
duals from these different groups for the benefit of the country
as a whole.
Thus, whereas the majority in DeFunis sidestepped the con-
stitutional issue, Justice Douglas did not view this case as moot.
33. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 49 (1991).
Professor Carter, in his very thoughtful and provocative book, criticizes programs that
compare minorities only with other minorities for practicing tokenism and stigmatization.
Id. In Carter's view, these programs are a not so subtle statement regarding the inability
of blacks to compete effectively against whites. Id. at 47.
34. Id.
35. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 333 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas asserted that
because the state school used a racial classification, the admissions process was subject
to the strictest scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
36. Id. at 335 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 340 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 326 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Instead, he viewed the question presented as "important and
crucial to the operation of our constitutional system. 41 He found
that the admissions program did not violate the Constitution and
that the law school had not invidiously discriminated against
Marco DeFunis. 42 He also suggested that it would be a different
case had the lawsuit requested a remedy that sought to displace
the applicant admitted in lieu of DeFunis.43 Furthermore, Justice
Douglas believed that minority groups should not receive favored
treatment on the basis of race.44 He also believed, however, that
the LSAT was not racially neutral in its impact on minority
groups.45 Because of this disparate impact, which in his view was
not the best measure of a minority applicant's ability to succeed
in law school, the admissions policy needed to treat minorities
as a separate class in order to ensure that racial factors would
neither harm nor help an applicant.46
For Justice Douglas, a diverse society was one that appreciated
cultural differences without penalizing minority cultures. Most
importantly, he wanted all people active in the public affairs of
this country to be selected based on talent and character rather
than race or culture.47 Thus, diversity at the time of DeFunis
meant cultural diversity, or the bringing together of individuals
from all walks of life.
B. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
The Burger Court could not long avoid deciding the issue that
it sidestepped in DeFunis. Four years after DeFunis, the Court
41. Id. at 344 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas suggested that the record would have
to show that the law school considered the applicant's potential to succeed in law school.
Id. He also suggested that as long as the law school followed proper procedures, the
institutional decision should be honored. Id.
44. Id. at 337 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 335 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 336-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In this passage, Justice Douglas stated:
There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred. The years of
slavery did more than retard the progress of blacks. Even a greater wrong
was done the whites by creating arrogance instead of humility and by
encouraging the growth of the fiction of a superior race. There is no superior
person by constitutional standards. A DeFunis who is white is entitled to
no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no
matter what his race or color. Whatever his race, he had a constitutional
right to have his application considered on its individual merits in a racially
neutral manner.
Id,
47. Id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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was embroiled once again in the affirmative action debate, this
time with a case involving a medical school in California. In
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,48 the Medical
School of the University of California at Davis (UC-Davis) denied
admission to Allan Bakke, a white male, even though it admitted
minority applicants whose grade point averages, Medical College
Admissions Test (MCAT) scores, and benchmark scores were
significantly below Bakke's. 49
The UC-Davis medical school had adopted a special admissions
program for minority group members.60 The minority admissions
committee was comprised of minority group members from the
medical school. Unlike the regular admissions committee, this
committee did not summarily reject applicants with grade point
averages below 2.5 on a 4.0 scale. The committee rated the
applicants and assigned each a benchmark score, but minority
applicants were compared only to other minority applicants.51
The special minority committee then presented its top candidates
to the regular admissions committee.5 2 The medical school faculty,
by vote, set the number of seats available for minority candi-
dates. 3 Throughout the litigation, the medical school class size
was one-hundred, with sixteen of those seats allocated for special
admissions.m
The medical school rejected Bakke's application in 1973 and
1974. In both years, it admitted minority applicants with lower
scores than Bakke's.55 After his rejection in 1974, Bakke filed
suit in California state court requesting mandatory, injunctive,
and declaratory relief compelling his admission to medical school.6
He argued that the special admissions program discriminated
against him because of his race, in violation of the California
Constitution,5 the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
48. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
49. Id. at 277. Benchmark scores were the result of each admissions committee member
rating an applicant from 1 to 100. Id. If there were five committee members a perfect
score would be 500. Id. These ratings included an assessment of the candidate's overall
grade point average (GPA), GPA in science courses, MCAT scores, recommendation
letters, extracurricular activities, and interview. Id. at 274.
50. Id. at 274.
51. See CARTER, supra note 33, at 47.
52. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Id. at 277.
56. Id.
57. CAL. CONST. art. I, S 21 provides, in relevant part: "No special privileges or
1994]
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Amendment, and section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.5
The Superior Court of California, the state trial court, found
that the UC-Davis special admissions program violated the United
States Constitution, the state constitution, and Title VI. 5 9 The
court held that the program operated as a quota system because
minority applicants competed against only each other for sixteen
seats in the class reserved for them.6 The state court declared
that the university could not use race as a factor in admissions
decisions.61 The court, however, did not order the medical school
to admit Bakke because "[Bakke did not] carry his burden of
proving that he would have been admitted but for the existence
of the special program. 62
Both Bakke and the university appealed the trial court's deci-
sion. Bakke appealed because he was denied admission and the
university appealed because the trial court declared that its
admissions program was unlawful.P Because of the importance
of the issues, the California Supreme Court transferred the case
directly from the trial court 4 The supreme court reasoned that
because the case involved a racial classification, it must apply
strict scrutiny. 65 Reviewing the university's justifications for the
special program, the court agreed that the goal of increasing the
number of minority physicians was a compelling interest, but
held that there were less intrusive means available than the
special admissions program.66 This court focused on the United
States Constitution and offered no opinion with respect to the
immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the
Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities
which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens." See Bakke, 438 U.S. at
278 n.10.
58. 42 U.S.C. S 2000d (1964) provides, in relevant part: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. There are two prongs to strict scrutiny analysis. "First, any racial classification
'must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.'... Second, the means chosen
by the State to effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored to the achievement of
that goal."' Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (citations omitted).
66. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279.
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state constitution or federal statute.6 7 The California Supreme
Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment required that 'no applicant may be rejected because
of his race, in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured
by standards applied without regard to race."' Thus, the state
supreme court ordered UC-Davis Medical School to admit Allan
Bakke.6 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order
to decide whether the use of a racial preference in this benign
context was constitutionally permissible.70 The opinion in this
decision raises more questions than it answers. Although all nine
justices voted on the legality of the UC-Davis program, they
were evenly divided on whether the special admissions program
violated Title VI. Four members of the Court, Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens concluded
that the special admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act.7 ' These justices thought the broad language of section
601 should be given its "natural meaning," which prohibits any
consideration of race.7 2 In the view of these justices, Title VI is
"more than a simple paraphrasing of what the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment would require."7 3 Under this approach, Title VI has
an independent force in addition to the Constitution.74
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun had a differ-
ent view of the scope of Title VI. These justices thought Title
VI went no further than the Constitution. In their view, Title VI
would prohibit only those racial criteria that the Fourteenth
Amendment would not allow. These justices thought that the use
of racial criteria as a means of remedying past societal discrim-
ination was consistent with the Constitution and, therefore, with
Title VI.7 6
The outcome in Bakke turned on the vote of Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., of Virginia, even though his analysis was not sup-
ported by a majority of the Court.7 6 Powell reviewed the legis-
67. Id. at 279.80.
68. Id. at 280 (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 281.
70. See id. at 279-81.
71. Id at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Id at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. 1d
75. I& at 328.
76. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 676 (4th ed. 1991).
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lative history of Title VI and concluded that supporters of the
bill had repeatedly declared that it had enacted constitutional
principles. 7 Powell concluded that Title VI prohibited only such
racial classifications that would violate the Fourteenth or Fifth
Amendments.7 8 He also concluded that "racial and ethnic distinc-
tions of any sort are inherently suspect" and call for "the most
exacting judicial examination. 79 Although this language strongly
suggests the traditional strict scrutiny approach, the use of the
imprecise words, "exacting judicial examination," raises the ques-
tion of whether Justice Powell was applying the traditional strict
scrutiny test for all racial classifications or something less exact-
ing for benign racial classifications.
Justice Powell concluded that although the medical school could
consider race as a factor in admissions decisions, race could not
be determinative. Moreover, Justice Powell's analysis concluded
that the UC-Davis admissions program violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 80
C. Justice Powell and Diversity
Although this decision left many important issues regarding
racial preferences unsettled,81 Justice Powell's opinion offered an
important discussion of his social theory on diversity. For the
first time, the Supreme Court, albeit one justice, articulated the
parameters of affirmative action in the context of graduate school
admissions. California offered the following reasons for its special
admissions program: (1) to reduce the underrepresentation of
minorities in the medical profession; 82 (2) to compensate for past
societal discrimination;83 (3) to increase minority physicians in
underserved communities;8 and (4) to obtain educational benefits
77. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 285 (Powell, J., plurality).
78. Id. at 287 (Powell, J., plurality).
79. Id. at 291 (Powell, J., plurality).
80. Id. at 320 (Powell, J., plurality).
81. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 76, at 676-77. Professors Nowak and Rotunda
point out that the Bakke decision was extremely narrow in scope. It applied only to the
constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education admissions programs. The
Supreme Court ruled only that the UC-Davis program violated Title VI. A majority of
the Court did not conclude that the program violated the Constitution, only Justice
Powell reached that conclusion. Noticeably absent was the Court's failure to adopt any
clear guidance on what constitutional standard would be applied in benign race classifi-
cations. Id.
82. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306 (Powell, J., plurality).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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from an ethnically diverse student body. 5 Of the four, diversity
was the only reason that Justice Powell found sufficiently com-
pelling to justify the use of race as a factor in admissions
decisions. Thus, of all the reasons the school set forth, diversity
alone was constitutionally permissible.8
What did "diversity" mean to the Court and why was it such
an important part of the Bakke decision? In Bakke, the Supreme
Court explored the contours of diversity in a specific racial
context. The Court extolled the virtues of diversity in the edu-
cational arena.8 Although this case represents the use of diver-
sity in its most positive form, it also represents the failure of
the Court to offer a probing inquiry regarding the benefits and
burdens of diversity. Justice Powell's justifications for the values
of diversity are reflected in the following passage:
In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant that
race has been a factor in some admission decisions. When the
Committee on Admissions reviews the large middle group of
applicants who are "admissible" and deemed capable of doing
good work in their courses, the race of an applicant may tip
the balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life
spent on a farm may tip the balance in other candidates' cases.
A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College
that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can
usually bring something that a white person cannot offer.8
With these sweeping generalities, Justice Powell gave his judicial
stamp of approval to the notion that diversity was good in the
educational context because it could enhance the classroom ex-,
perience.
Noticeably absent from Justice Powell's diversity lexicon was
a definition of the "something" that he alleged was beneficial.
Even Justice Powell fell into the trap of racial essentialism here,
asserting that a black student will usually bring something to
the classroom that a white person cannot offer. Powell suggests,
or at least implies, that there is a black experience and a white
experience. Justice Powell's reasoning is based on an assumption
that two people will each bring something unique to the classroom
because they are different individuals with different life experi-
85. Id.
86. Id. at 307-12 (Powell, J., plurality).
87. Id. at 322-24 (Powell, J., plurality).
88. Id. at 323 (Powell, J., plurality).
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ences. No one would argue with that statement, but it does not
help our understanding of the benefits of diversity, nor does it
explain what is meant by diversity.
When the Supreme Court decided Bakke, this country was ten
years removed from the violence of the late 1960s, including the
assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King,
Jr., and the subsequent riots across the country. Our society was
in transition and was making genuine efforts to address some of
the societal ills identified in the sixties. Affirmative action was
an attempt to address historical racial inequality. The country
was asked to view its minority populations not as problems but
as resources.89
Out of this calamity grew an approach that began to recognize
that a diverse student body was essential to the quality of
education9 President William Gordon Bowen of Princeton Uni-
versity said it best when he stated that a great deal of learning
occurs through the interactions among students of different sexes,
races, religions, and backgrounds.91 In President Bowen's view,
people with different backgrounds who come from cities, rural
areas, and different countries offer a variety of interests, talents,
and perspectives. These qualities stimulate students to learn from
their differences and to re-examine deeply held assumptions about
themselves and the world around them.92 The contribution of
diversity was thus seen as substantial,93 however amorphous the
Bakke opinion left it.
Although in Bakke the Court clearly held that the interest of
diversity was compelling in the context of a university's admis-
sions program, the school could not elevate ethnic diversity to
become the determinative factor upon which it based its admis-
sions decisions. 94 As Justice Powell explained:
It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a
specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed
to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining
percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. The
89. See O'BRIEN, supra note 14, at 134044.
90. Id. at 312. For a thoughtful contemporaneous discussion on what the author calls
legitimate preference for one group in the admission process, see Robert A. Sedler,
Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitution: Bakke v. Regents of the University of
California, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 340 (1977).
91. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 n.48 (Powell, J., plurality).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 313 (Powell, J., plurality).
94. Id. at 314 (Powell, J., plurality).
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diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses
a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element 95
Justice Powell concluded that an admissions program that as-
signed a fixed number of places to a minority group would "hinder
rather than further attainment of genuine diversity."96
Justice Powell cited the Harvard College admissions plan as
an example of a program that took race into account in achieving
the educational diversity valued by'the First Amendment.97 The
Harvard plan, however, unlike the UC-Davis policy, did not guar-
antee a fixed number of seats to minority applicants. Moreover,
the Bakke opinion reveals that until a short time before this case,
diversity meant only geographic diversity.99 Powell's opinion
adopted Harvard College's concept of diversity, that had itself
expanded to include students from disadvantaged racial and eth-
nic groups in addition to those from diverse geographical regions.1°4
The goal of the Harvard plan's diversity necessarily requires
that race will be a factor in some admissions decisions, but it
will not be the sole factor and it will be balanced against other
considerations. Quoting from the Harvard program, Justice Pow-
ell noted, "In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant
that race has been a factor in some admissions decisions." 101
In assessing the role that race has played in admissions deci-
sions, it is important to keep in mind how the admissions process
works. Under the Harvard plan, like many other admissions
programs, the difficult part of the admissions process is selecting
a limited number of students from a large pool of talented.capable
individuals. Most applicants are qualified, that is, within a com-
petitive range.1 12 Only a small percentage are disqualified by
95. Id. at 315 (Powel, J., plurality).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 316 (Powell, J., plurality). See Justice Powell's comments on the First
Amendment and the "robust exchange of ideas." Id. at 313 (Powell, J., plurality) (quoting
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
98. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316 (Powell, J., plurality).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 1 use "qualified" to mean the achievement of a score within a competitive range
that indicates the applicant's ability to complete successfully a particular educational
program of study. For example, suppose a test is devised to provide a music school with
results that predict an applicant's success in completing a music curriculum. The highest
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falling below the competitive range. The debate centers on meas-
uring the competitive range.
With respect to minority applicants, and indeed most appli-
cants, objective qualifications such as standardized examinations
are not the best indicators of ability to succeed. Thus, admissions
committees are required to draw lines based on both objective
and subjective criteria. Many members of the majority become
quite concerned when schools accept minority applicants with
objective measurements, for example, test scores, that are not
as high as majority applicants' scores. 1 3 These majority members,
however, discount the importance of the subjective factors in
this equation.
This dual standard for objective criteria fueled a major con-
troversy at Georgetown University Law Center in the spring of
1991 regarding the different scores achieved by black law stu-
dents as a group and white law students as a group.104 Critics of
the dual standard, such as Timothy Maguire, pointed out that
the average LSAT score for majority students was 43, whereas
the average for minority students was 36. Additionally, Mr.
Maguire noted that "[t]here was also a significant difference
score possible is ten and the lowest score is zero. Although the test is not 100% accurate
as a predictor of success, it is useful in determining those with music skills sufficient to
successfully complete the course, those who may not complete the course, and those who
may have difficulty completing the course. The school may view applicants scorina six
and above as falling within a competitive range. Anyone scoring five or below is not as
easily placed in the competitive range without some additional factors to indicate the
individual's ability to succeed. Scores of one, two, or three may not be in the competitive
range and the school may choose not to consider applicants with these scores because of
experience that shows that people scoring in this range fail the music curriculum. Thus,
when I discuss qualifications, the definition includes those people within the competitive
range with all factors considered. Therefore, an applicant with a score of six or five, or
possibly four, may still fall within the competitive range because of factors in the person's
background that would indicate his or her ability to complete the curriculum.
One study concluded that most law schools referred to minimum GPAs and LSAT
scores as "points below which schools tended to reject applicants unless other bases for
admission were better than average." Patricia W. Lunnenborg & Donna Radford, LSAT.
Survey of Actual Practice, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1966).
103. See TIMOTHY MAGUIRE, ADDRESSING THE UNSPEAKABLE, THE GEORGETOWN LAW
ADMISSIONS CONTROVERSY AND POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IN HIGHER EDUCATION, (Young Am.'s
Found. (1991)) (on file with William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law); Timothy
Maguire, Admissions Apartheid, LAW WKLY., Apr. 8, 1991, at 5 [hereinafter Maguire,
Admissions Apartheid]; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133
(1975) (discussing affirmative action as a moral wrong); Randall Kennedy, supra note 16;
Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758; Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism,
Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581
(1977).
104. See Maguire, Admissions Apartheid, supra note 103.
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between black and white GPAs."105 Black students accepted at
Georgetown averaged 3.2, and their white counterparts averaged
3.7.106 Maguire concluded that:
It has become abundantly clear to me that the greatest problem
law schools are facing in their quest for diversity is not lack
of black role models, hostile environments, or biased journal
selection procedures. The biggest problem is that in ... every
level of postsecondary education black achievements are far
inferior to those of whites.107
Moreover, Maguire writes, "[tihere is no sign that currently-
fashionable 'diversity-enhancing' reforms will solve this prob-
lem., 08
This argument is repeated again and again by many people,
usually majority members, who simply point to the numbers and
say that some people are less qualified than others. What the
argument fails to understand is that objective criteria are only
one factor among many that schools use to determine whether a
person can successfully complete a particular course of study. An
additional weakness of the argument is its blind acceptance of
the belief that numerical scores on examinations always indicate
whether a person is qualified. At best, these numbers help to
determine whether a person is within the competitive range. Test
scores are only a starting point, and some would argue not a
very good starting point at that.10 9
As the Harvard College admissions program operates, the
ethnic background of an applicant may be a plus, "yet it does
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Maguire notes that although people of color do not face the problems caused
by an unfriendly environment at historically black colleges, black academic performance,
at least as measured by LSAT scores, remains very low at these institutions. He reports
that at all-black Howard University, one out of nine students who took the LSAT placed
in the upper half of students taking the test (31+), and 55% scored between zero and
nineteen, which is the bottom 10% of all test takers. At Morehouse College, 55% of
students who took the LSAT also scored between zero and nineteen. At Hampton
University, 61% fell within this range. At Jackson State College, the figure was 74%.
At Grambling, the figure was 84%. Id.
With these statistics, Maguire concludes that black achievements are far inferior to
those of whites. Of course, Mr. Maguire has made the same assumption that most other
majority individuals do when arguing this point-he has accepted without batting an eye
the validity of the LSAT as a magical predictor of one's intelligence, achievements, and
ability to succeed in law school. This assumption is the root of the problem.
109. See supra note 28.
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not insulate the individual from comparison with all other can-
didates for the available seats.""' This kind of admissions pro-
gram assesses every applicant on her own merits. Thus, seats
are not filled because of skin color, even though it may be a plus
for that particular applicant. The applicant losing the seat was
not foreclosed from consideration, but was determined not to be
as desirable a candidate based on a thorough review of her
combined qualifications. Consideration of these combined qualifi-
cations includes both objective and subjective factors."'
The concerns articulated by the dean of. admissions at Harvard
College are similar to the concerns that the admissions committee
at the University of Mississippi Law School addresses each year.
As an admissions committee member, I am not only interested
in good grades and good test scores, but I also look for the
"complete person." I would like our student body to be composed
of talented, interesting people, people who have a wide range of
life experiences: older students, students who have had experi-
ence in other disciplines, students who have military experience,
married students, students with disabilities, students who are
parents, students who have travelled extensively, and students
from different cultural backgrounds. All of these people add a
richness to the student body that benefits our educational mis-
sion. In my view, this kind of diversity contributes to a rich
classroom experience. Students with diverse backgrounds and
interests bring different perspectives to the classroom debate."2
110. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978). For example, the
Harvard College admissions program brochure provides:
Faced with the dilemma of choosing among a large number of "qualified"
candidates, the Committee on Admissions could use the single criterion of
scholarly excellence and attempt to determine who among the candidates
were likely to perform best academically. But for the past 30 years the
Committee on Admissions has never adopted this approach. The belief has
been that if scholarly excellence were the sole or even predominant criterion,
Harvard College would lose a great deal of its vitality and intellectual
excellence and that the quality of the educational experience offered to all
students would suffer .... The effectiveness of our students' educational
experience has seemed to the Committee to be affected as importantly by a
wide variety of interests, talents, backgrounds, and career goals as it is by
a fine faculty and our libraries, laboratories, and housing arrangements.Id.
111. Id.; see supra note 102.
112. I recently participated in a conference that demonstrated perfectly the advantages
of diversity. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws brought
together lawyers, judges, professors, and practitioners from all over the country. Each
person had a unique perspective that brought helpful insight to the legislative debate.
If the Supreme Court is to accept diversity as a compelling
state interest, it should be able to articulate clearly what that
term means. Justice Powell in Bakke introduced a new concept
of diversity into the legal lexicon. Perhaps this expanded concept
of diversity was ill-conceived from the start because all Ameri-
cans are ethnically diverse. Furthermore, no one has examined
the benefits and burdens of diversity. Although few would argue
with the noble intention of diversity as it was explained in Bakke,
it raises two problems.
First, as Bakke demonstrates, the definition of diversity is not
static, but has an evolving meaning that depends on its social
context. At Harvard College, diversity expanded from its original
meaning of geographical diversity to include disadvantaged, ec-
onomic, racial, and ethnic groups.113 Thus, the Supreme Court in
Bakke and DeFunis discussed diversity in the context of geo-
graphical, ethnic, and socio-economic differences, among others.
In contrast, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan"4 and
United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia,"5 the Supreme Court
and the Fourth Circuit discussed the value of diversity in the
context of gender discrimination and institutional diversity.16 In
these later cases the Court used diversity in a very different
social context, but with no "mediating principles.."117 In each of
these cases, the diversity factor had a significant impact on
institutional policies. In some cases, the impact of the diversity
factor has been beneficial. In others, however, it has been det-
rimental to racial and cultural progress."8
The second problem with the Bakke formulation of diversity is
that courts have recently used this concept to justify results that
have questionable constitutionality under the Equal Protection
Clause."9 In United States v. Fordice120 and United States v.
113. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 322-23.
114. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
115. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
116. See discussion infra parts H.A., III.A.
117. See Foster, supra note 12, at 130. Professor Foster argues that diversity is an
empty concept because there is no principle for determining which differences should
count. She is critical of the current concept of diversity because (1) it is an empty concept;
(2) there is a prospective value of diversity which should include the experiences of those
who were excluded in the past; and (3) current diversity concepts marginalize individuals
who possess that difference such that others view them as less qualified. Id.
118. Id. at 133. Professor Foster makes the point that once an organization has "enough"
of a particular minority represented, it can then justify excluding that minority on
diversity grounds. Id.
119. See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992); United States v. Commonwealth
of Va., 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
120. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
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Commonwealth of Virginia,121 the United States Supreme Court
and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals kept alive the specter
of publicly financed single-race and single-sex institutions. In the
Fordice decision, the Supreme Court opened the door for the
continued existence of publicly financed all-black colleges in the
name of diversity. 12 Similarly, in Commonwealth of Virginia, the
Fourth Circuit required Virginia to remedy Virginia Military
Institute's male-only admissions policy. 1' One option for the Com-
monwealth is to establish parallel institutions or programs for
women, also in the name of diversity.1 24
What lurks behind the door that the courts have opened
through these opinions is troubling because it leads to a passage
back in time when separate but equal was the law of the land.
Although this modern separate but equal approach is pursued in
the name of diversity and, at times, at the behest of the minority
groups allegedly benefited by the 1954 Brown1 25 decision, it re-
mains, nevertheless, a tragic choice of direction. However well
intentioned these recent decisions may be, the result is an ac-
centuation on differences and divisiveness, an elevation of the
importance of the cultural identity over the national identity, and
a heightened sense of separateness rather than oneness or unity.
This direction has already proven to be problematic. A return to
that path further delays our age of enlightenment and growth
as national citizens and members of the world community.
II. OPENING THE DOOR
A. Nurses Can Be Men
Joe Hogan was a registered nurse and worked in a Columbus,
Mississippi, medical center. 26 The Mississippi University for
Women (MUW) is also located in Columbus and was established
by the Mississippi Legislature in 1884 "for the Education of
White Girls."'' MUW established the nursing school in 1971 as
121. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
122. See discussion infra part III.C.
123. See discussion infra part III.A.
124. Comwnwealth of Va., 976 F.2d at 900.
125. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
126. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720 (1982).
127. Id. at 720.
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a two-year program, but by 1982 it offered both a four-year
baccalaureate program and a graduate program.128
Hogan applied for admission to MUW nursing school in 1979,
but was denied solely because of his sex.1 The school told Hogan
he could only audit classes.1 30 He was otherwise qualified and,
had he been female, MUW would have admitted him and allowed
him to enroll in courses for credit.1 31 Hogan filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Missis-
sippi claiming that MUW's single-sex admission policy for the
nursing school violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.132
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of MUW
and dismissed Hogan's claim. The court applied a rational rela-
tionship standard of review to the single-sex admissions policy
and concluded that MUW's single-sex policy bore a "rational
relationship to the State's legitimate interest 'in providing the
greatest practical range of educational opportunities for its fe-
male student population." '1 The State convinced the district
court that MUW's policy was not arbitrary because such a policy
was consistent with educational theories that maintained that
students derive unique benefits from single-sex institutions.?
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
district court improperly used a rational relationship standard to
test the constitutionality of the admissions policy. 35 Instead, the
district court should have required the State to carry a heavier
burden of'showing that the gender-based classification was sub-
stantially related to an important governmental objective.13 The
Fifth Circuit recognized that the State had a significant interest
in providing educational opportunities for all its citizens even
though Mississippi had enacted a statute in support of the con-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 721.
130. Id.
131. Id. The parties stipulated that but for Hogan's gender, he was qualified for
admission. Id.; see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 646 F.2d 1116, 1117 (5th Cir.
1981).
132. Hogan. 458 U.S. at 721. Hogan requested injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory
relief. Id.
133. Id. (citation omitted).
134. Id. Recently, Virginia Military Institute articulated this theory in United States
v. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993). See
infra notes 190-237 and accompanying text.
135. Hogan, 646 F.2d at 1118.
136. Id.
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tinued existence of an all-female school.137 The Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that "the maintenance of MUW today as the only state-
supported single-sex collegiate institution in the State cannot be
squared with the Constitution. Mississippi suggests no interest
of male students that is served by this disparate treatment of
females."lS8 Thus, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court with instructions for further proceedings and va-
cated the summary judgment dismissing Hogan's claim for money
damages.139
At the rehearing, the State argued that Congress limited the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment by adopting section 901(a)(5),
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.140 This statute
expressly exempted institutions that, from their establishment,
had traditionally and continually maintained a policy of single-
sex admissions."' The Fifth Circuit rejected the State's argument,
holding that the congressional power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of the amend-
ment through appropriate legislation does not allow Congress to
authorize states to maintain practices that violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari143 and affirmed the judgment of the Fifth
Circuit.144
The Supreme Court held that a classification based on gender
"must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive
137. Id. at 1119. To justify the continued single-sex admissions policy at MUW, the
State relied on MISS. CODE ANN. S 37-117-3 (1972). This section provides in part:
The purpose and aim of the Mississippi State College for Women is the
moral and intellectual advancement of the girls of the state by the mainte-
nance of a first-class institution for their education in the arts and sciences,
for their training in normal school methods and kindergarten, for their
instruction in bookkeeping, photography, stenography, telegraphy, and type-
writing, and in designing, drawing, engraving, and painting, and their indus-
trial application, and for their instruction in fancy, general and practical
needlework, and in such other industrial branches as experience, from time
to time, shall suggest as necessary or proper to fit them for the practical
affairs of life.
MISS. CODE ANN. S 37117-3.
138. Hogan, 646 F.2d at 1119.
139. Id. at 1119-20.
140. 20 U.S.C. S 1681(a)(5) (1988).
141. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 722. Section 901(a) of Title IX provides: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. S 1681(a).
142. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723.
143. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 454 U.S. 962 (1981).
144. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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justification' for the classification."4 s The "burden is met only by
showing at least that the classification serves 'important govern-
mental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed'
are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives."'14 6 The first step in this analysis is a determination by the
court of whether the State's objective is legitimate and impor-
tant. 1 7 The second step is a determination by the court of
"whether the requisite direct, substantial relationship between
objective and means is present."4 8 The Court noted that "[t]he
purpose of requiring that close relationship is to assure that the
validity of a classification is determined through reasoned anal-
ysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional,
often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and
women."
49
Here, the State's justification for the single-sex admissions
policy at MUW's nursing school was that it constituted educa-
tional affirmative action and helped to compensate for past dis-
crimination against women.150 The Supreme Court was not
persuaded by the State's justification. The Court found that
women had been the primary beneficiaries of training in the field
of nursing. Women did not lack opportunities in the nursing field
even before the school of nursing's first class enrolled in 1971.151
Ninety-four percent of nursing degrees granted in Mississippi
were awarded to women and ninety-eight percent of the nursing
degrees awarded nationally were awarded to women.182 Thus, the
Court concluded that MUW's single-sex policy operated to per-
petuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively female
province.'13 The benign compensatory purpose was not validated
by the statistical evidence representing an abundance of women
145. Id. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) and Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
146. Id. (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). See also
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), revg J.E.B. v. State ex rel. T.B.,
606 So. 2d 156 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). In J.E.B., the Court applied intermediate scrutiny
to a gender classification regarding jury selection. This level of review is fact intensive.
The Court held that sex-based peremptory challenges that exclude men or women from
jury service are unconstitutional because they are not substantially related to the
important state interest of assuring a fair and impartial trial. Id.
147. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 725-26.
150. Id. at 727.
151. Id. at 729.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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in the nursing field. Consequently, the Court held that the State's
articulated objective was not legitimate.e54
Moreover, the Court concluded that the MUW admissions pol-
icy failed the second prong of the equal protection test, which
requires a "show[ing] that the gender-based classification is sub-
stantially and directly related to its proposed compensatory ob-
jective."155 The MUW policy allowed male students to audit
classes at the school of nursing. This policy undermined the
school's claim that the mere presence of men adversely affected
women students. 16 The Court found that admitting men to the
classroom had no impact on teaching style, did not affect the
performance of the female nursing students, and did not lead to
male domination in the classroom. 157 .
Thus, the Court found that the State of Mississippi had "fallen
far short of establishing the 'exceedingly persuasive justification'
needed to sustain the gender-based classification" and had vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.e The Court was equally unpersuaded by the State's
argument that section 901(a) in Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972159 permitted the institution to exist as it had in
the past.6 ' First, the Court concluded that it was not clear that
Congress intended to exempt schools like MUW from any con-
stitutional obligation. Rather, the exemption applied only to the
requirements of Title IX.161 Second, even if Congress had envi-
sioned a constitutional exemption through this legislation, section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress authority only
to enforce its guarantees, not to restrict, abrogate, or dilute
them. 62
154. Id. at 730. Several legal scholars have criticized the compensatory purpose justi-
fication for single-sex policies. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Three
Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REY. 751 (1991).
155. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 731.
158. Id.
159. 20 U.S.C. S 1681(a) (1988).
160. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 732. The State argued that S 901(a)(5) granted an exemption
from the general prohibition against discrimination to institutions that traditionally and
continually from their establishment had a policy of admitting only students of one sex.
Title IX, the State argued, was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the
Amendment. Thus, Congress curtailed the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to
institutions falling within the language of S 901(a)(5). Id
161. Id.
162. Id.
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In this 5-4 decision, Chief Justice Burger dissented to empha-
size that the holding was limited to the context of a professional
nursing school. 16 He was concerned that lower courts might
misread this decision and apply it to a broader spectrum of cases.
He also posited that the State might be justified in maintaining
an all-women business school or liberal arts school.16
Justice Blackmun's dissent expresses concern with what he
labels as a "spillover"' 65 effect of the Court's decision. He rea-
soned that although the Court was purporting to write narrowly,
the existence of another state educational institution geared to
a single sex was in jeopardy even though equivalent programs
were offered elsewhere within the state to the opposite sex.166
Blackmun stated that he "hope[s] we do not lose all values that
some think are worthwhile (and are not based on differences of
race or religion) and relegate ourselves to needless conformity."'67
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, also dissented. In
their view, the majority was "bow[ing] to conformity [and holding]
unconstitutional ... an element of diversity that has characterized
much of American education and enriched much of American
life."' These justices criticized the Court for holding that states
may not constitutionally permit the operation of institutions of
higher learning open only to women.6 9
Additionally, these justices expressed displeasure that the Court
made such a pronouncement in a case involving the personal
convenience of one man.170 Justices Powell and Rehnquist argued
that this was not a case in which the Petitioner had no other
alternatives and would be prevented from pursuing his chosen
profession.1 71 Mississippi had two other schools offering coedu-
cational programs in nursing that Hogan could have attended. 72
These justices argued that it was legal error to apply a height-
ened scrutiny analysis to a case such as this that involved a
163. Id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 734-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 735 (Powell, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. I&
172. Id. The dissent characterized Hogan's harm as one of inconvenience because he
would have had to drive 147 miles to the University of Mississippi in Jackson or 178
miles to the University of Southern Mississippi in Hattiesburg. Because he lived in
Columbus, it made sense for Hogan to attend MUW.
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"narrowly utilized state classification that provides an additional
choice for women."'173 Rather, they stated, such heightened scru-
tiny is reserved for cases of "genuine sexual stereotyping.' 74
Although Justices Powell and Rehnquist offered no examples of
"genuine sexual stereotyping" to distinguish it from the kind of
stereotyping MUW was practicing, they implied that Hogan,
because he was a male, was not a victim of genuine sex stereo-
typing. They concluded that the Court should have applied a
lower level of scrutiny in reviewing the MUW admissions policy.
This reasoning suggests that Justices Powell and Rehnquist would
like to have their cake and eat it, too. Apparently, in their view,
gender stereotyping is genuine only when it adversely affects
women.
Additionally, these dissenting justices offered examples of his-
torically single-sex institutions, all of which are private schools.175
Justices Powell and Rehnquist also cited studies that indicate
the benefits of both all-male and all-female institutions.176 But the
issue is not whether single-sex institutions serve some beneficial
purpose, but rather, whether it is constitutional for the State to
support such institutions. These dissenters thought that it was
appropriate "within the context of a public system that offers a
diverse range of campuses, curricula, and educational alter-
natives' 177 to accommodate those people who sought the benefits
of attending a single-sex institution. 178
Justices Powell and Rehnquist argued that the Court had
improperly applied the equal protection standard generally ap-
plicable to sex discrimination because in this context the State
was attempting to expand women's choices. 79 Thus, these justices
would sustain Mississippi's single-sex admissions policy under a
rational basis analysis. 18 But Powell and Rehnquist further ar-
173. Id. at 736 (Powell, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 736-37 (Powell, J., dissenting). Listed in the dissent are examples of insti-
tutions that were historically single sex, such as Yale, Princeton, Mount Holyoke, Vassar,
Wellesley, Radcliffe, Smith, Bryn Mawr, and Barnard. Significantly, all of these institutions
are privately funded.
176. Id. at 738 (Powell, J., dissenting).
177. I& at 739-40 (Powell, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting).
179. Id. For an explanation of the equal protection standard courts generally employ
to analyze gender-based classifications, see infa notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
180. I& at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting). The rational basis test requires that state action
be rationally related to the accomplishment of a legitimate governmental purpose. City
of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 303 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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gued that the admissions policy would also survive heightened
scrutiny analysis, as the State's purpose was "legitimate and
substantial."181 In support, the justices offered that "[g]enerations
of our finest minds, both among educators and students, have
believed that single-sex, college-level institutions afford distinc-
tive benefits." 18 Although they conceded that there are those
who hold different views, Powell and Rehnquist set forth only
that a debate existed with respect to the benefits of single-sex
institutions. The existence of such a debate, however, is not a
basis for describing the State's policy as legitimate and substan-
tial.
The dissent by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, stripped to its
bare essentials, was founded on tradition. It concluded that, "In
sum, the practice of voluntarily chosen single-sex education is an
honored tradition in our country, even it it now rarely exists in
state colleges and universities."'8 The State cannot, however,
persuasively articulate a legitimate and substantial interest based
on this argument of tradition.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist were not finished, however. In
their conclusion, they asserted that Hogan was not a simple sex
discrimination case but that the whole notion of diversity was at
stake. Accordingly, they argued:
A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect
for diversity. This has been characteristic of the peoples from
numerous lands who have built our country. It is the essence
of our democratic system. At stake in this case as I see it is
the preservation of a small aspect of this diversity. But that
aspect is by no means insignificant, given our heritage of
available choice between single-sex and coeducational institu-
tions of higher learning.' 4
In contrast, the DeFunis and Bakke cases did not speak of
diversity in the context of an educational system. Diversity in
DeFunis and Bakke centered on the geographical and ethnic
backgrounds of the individual. In Hogan, though, Justices Powell
and Rehnquist introduced a structural concept of diversity that
since has expanded to include the admissions practices of edu-
cational institutions. Although they may be right that America
181. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 745 (Powell, J., dissenting).
19941 37
38 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [VOl. 1:11
has respected diversity, Powell and Rehnquist have conveniently
and perhaps improperly expanded its meaning to include a jus-
tification for publicly supported single-sex institutions of higher
education. What else can be justified in the name of diversity?
Single-race institutions of higher education? Single-religion insti-
tutions of higher education? Should all of these institutions be
publicly financed? This perspective is what one scholar refers to
as the "dark side of diversity,"'185 the side that provides a reason
to exclude or isolate.18
B. The Turning Point
The dissent of Justices Powell and Rehnquist is critical because
it condones a judicial trek toward the days of separate but equal
without a careful examination of this concept of diversity. I would
not be so concerned if this judicial tendency started and stopped
with the MUW case and the dissent in that opinion, but that is
not what happened. Rather, what happened is that a federal
district court judge followed this new view of diversity in the
Virginia Military Institute (VMI) case.187 It also became a part of
the Fourth Circuit's decision in the VMI case for which certiorari
was subsequently denied.M The Fourth Circuit's decision kept
the door open to the possibility of publicly financed single-sex
institutions.
The Supreme Court also carried the banner for this new
diversity movement in United States v. Fordice,18 an opinion that
paved the way for the possibility of maintaining publicly financed
single-race institutions. The Supreme Court has left the door to
the past ajar, and some of the old ghosts are creeping into our
modern jurisprudence. The tendency is a dangerous one because
it provides the building blocks for divisiveness. It also evidences
the Court's uncertainty regarding the proper direction for cases
involving publicly financed single-race or single-sex institutions.
The Court is understandably reluctant to say there is no place
in our educational system for publicly financed single-sex or
185. Mary M. Cheh, An Essay on VMI and Military Service: Yes, We Do Have to Be
Equal Together, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 58-61 (1993).
186. Id. at 60.
187. United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991). vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431
(1993).
188. 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
189. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
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single-race or single-something-else institutions, but if it is un-
willing to close the door to these kinds of institutions, it has by
default opened the door to revisit separate but equal in the
context of diversity.
Although I believe there is a value to single-interest institu-
tions, I am not sure it is constitutionally permissible for the
government to publicly support such institutions, nor am I sure
that there is a substantial governmental interest involved. Though
recent federal court decisions suggest that publicly financed
separate-sex institutions of higher education may be constitution-
ally permissible, none of these courts has carefully examined the
alleged benefits of this new use of diversity in the context of
the Court's two-pronged intermediate standard of review. Rather,
the courts have summarily concluded that the government's in-
terest is legitimate and is substantially related to its compensa-
tory objective.
III. GHOSTS FROM THE PAST
A. Women Can Be Soldiers Too
United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia (the VMI case)
directly raises the question of whether the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits the public main-
tenance of a single-sex institution.'9 In the VMI case, the United
States Department of Justice brought suit against Virginia Mil-
itary Institute in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Virginia on behalf of a female high-school student
who sought consideration for admission to all-male VMI.' s9 Judge
Kiser held that VMI could continue to maintain its single-sex
admissions policy because its unique adversative educational
method contributed to diversity in Virginia's higher educational
system.'9 Although the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals later
vacated and remanded the district court's decision, 93 both the
district court and court of appeals decisions promote an expanded
190. United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
191. Id. at 894.
192. See United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (W.D. Va.
1991). vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
193. Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d at 900.
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view of diversity which includes the possibility of publicly sup-
ported single-sex institutions.
Moreover, both decisions justified this expanded view of di-
versity and the benefits of single-sex institutions on the basis of
students' alleged achievement of undifferentiated intangibles such
as better self-esteem, aspirations for higher degrees, more aca-
demic involvement, and the increased likelihood of carrying out
career plans.19' The courts based some of these determinations
on the conclusions of a book published in 1977.195 Some of the
findings may be outdated. It is difficult to attach much weight
to such information without a full engagement on the issue of
single-sex education. 196
Equal protection jurisprudence requires heightened scrutiny in
the area of gender classifications. 197 Courts apply an intermediate
level test to determine whether they can uphold the discrimina-
tory classification under the Constitution. That test requires the
State to provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the
classification.9 s The test has two components. First, the classifi-
194. Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d at 897-98; Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. 1409-
10. Historically, single-sex primary and secondary schools have been a rarity in American
public education. See Comment, Single-Sex Public Schools: The Last Bastion of Separate
But Equal?, 1977 DUKE L.J. 259; Jack G. Steigelfest, Comment, The End of an Era for
Single-Sex Schools: Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 15 CONN. L. REv. 353
(1983) (discussing the Court's willingness to investigate the objectives underlying the
maintenance of single-sex schools).
195. Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d at 897-98; Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. 1409-
10 (citing ALEXANDER ASTIN, FOUR CRITICAL YEARS (1977)). Mr. Astin is a professor of
higher education at the University of California, Los Angeles, and president of the Higher
Education Research Institute. Mr. Astin's book was the culmination of 17 years of research
and its focus was the impact of college on students overall. The author did not undertake
the book to compare and contrast single-sex institutions with coeducational institutions.
Id
196. Cheh, supra note 185, at 58. Professor Cheb, in addressing the same criticism of
the diversity justification, stated:
Nevertheless it remains unclear what weight to give these conclusions
[regarding single-sex institutions] in the absence of a full engagement on the
issue. The Supreme Court has yet to meet the matter head on, and because
VMI offered a unique educational experience not available to men and women,
VMI was not the vehicle for that debate. If the issue is met squarely, it
may be that the findings on single-sex schools are now outdated, indeter-
minate, or evolving. It may be that women are the only true beneficiaries
of single-gender experiences precisely because they may need-as men
presumably do not-a "safe haven" from the dampening influence of society's
gender stereotypes. Single-sex education can never be justified except in
the context of an actual educational system where the advantages and
disadvantages of maintaining a gender-segregated system are fully explored.
Id. (footnote omitted).
197. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982).
198. Id. at 731.
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cation must serve an important governmental objective, and
second, the discriminatory means employed must be substantially
related to the achievement of the governmental objective.199
Judge Kiser, in his district court opinion, distinguished the
VMI case from Hogan on two grounds. The first distinction was
factual. Although the Court found in Hogan that no harm resulted
from allowing men to attend nursing classes, Judge Kiser rea-
soned that harm would result from allowing women to attend
VMPI Judge Kiser explained, "key elements of the adversative
VMI educational system, with its focus on barracks life, would
be fundamentally altered, and the distinctive ends of the system
would be thwarted, if VMI were forced to admit females and to
make changes necessary to accommodate their needs and inter-
ests."20' The second distinction was based on the State's asserted
important objective. In Hogan, the reason Mississippi offered to
justify discrimination was affirmative action, but in the VMI case
Virginia's reason was that the "male-only admissions policy at
VMI promotes diversity within its statewide system of higher
education."202
Judge Kiser concluded that
[T]he Court found that Mississippi's proffered explanation failed
both prongs of the intermediate scrutiny test, i.e., that it was
not an important governmental objective and that the means
of advancing the objective were not substantially related to
the achievement of that objective. In contrast, diversity in
education has been recognized both judicially and by education
experts as being a legitimate objective. The sole way to attain
single-gender diversity is to maintain a policy of admitting
only one gender to an institution.23
To grant legitimacy to the expansive redefinition of diversity,
Judge Kiser concluded that courts and educational experts have
recognized single-sex diversity. His support for this contention
199. Id. at 730; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (setting forth that
intermediate level scrutiny analysis requires that classifications based on sex must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives).
200. United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (W.D. Va. 1991),
vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992). cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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is Williams v. McNair,°4 a case decided in 1970 and filed by a
group of males to enjoin enforcement of a South Carolina statute
that required by implication, not by express language, that Winth-
rop College admit only girls20 5 In Williams, however, the court
applied a mode of Equal Protection Clause analysis for gender
classifications that has since become outdated. Because Williams
was a 1970 decision, the court applied a rational basis approach
rather than the intermediate level, review as first required by
Craig v. Boren in 1976.208 Judge Kiser's reliance on Williams,
therefore, was misplaced.
Judge Kiser also cited Ayers v. Allain, 0 7 a case that involved
eight Mississippi schools, as an example of a decision that ex-
tended the meaning of diversity to include the "freedom to create
different missions at different state universities, in order to
promote diverse educational opportunities within the state.120
The Supreme Court subsequently vacated and remanded that
Fifth Circuit decision relied upon by Judge Kiser.20 9 Additionally,
Ayers was inapposite, as none of the publicly funded institutions
of higher education in Mississippi had single-sex or single-race
admissions policies. It is true that each of Mississippi's eight
publicly supported universities had different mission statements
and such mission variety does contribute to educational diversity.
However, none of those missions, at the time of the Fifth Circuit's
204. Id. at 1409 (citing Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970)). Judge Kiser
also cited Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affld per euriam, 430
U.S. 703 (1977). Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. at 1413. In Vorchheimer, the city of
Philadelphia maintained four high schools with different admissions requirements. Vor-
chheimer, 532 F.2d at 881. This school system included two single-sex high schools, Central
High for boys and Girls High School for girls. Both schools offered college preparatory
courses and both schools were comparable in quality. Id. The plaintiff, a female, would
have been able to qualify academically for attendance at Central, but for her gender. Id.
The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff's interest was outweighed by the harm caused
by requiring her admission to an all-male school. See id. at 888.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), is also viewed as a case that provides a good
example of relevant distinctions between the two genders. But the basis for this decision,
the military conscription requirement, has been significantly undermindd by amendment
to the law and changes in policy regarding women serving in combat positions. See 10
U.S.C. S 113 (1991); PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE ARMED
FORCES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (Nov. 15, 1992).
205. Williams, 316 F. Supp. at 135 & n.2.
206. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For an explanation of intermediate level scrutiny, see supra
notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
207. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. at 1409 (citing Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676
(5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992)).
208. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. at 1409.
209. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
decision, included single-sex or single-race policies.210 Thus, Judge
Kiser's reliance on Ayers is also misplaced.
Additionally, to refer to VMI as an example of educational
diversity is to employ a post hoc rationalization. Diversity had
nothing to do with the establishment of VMI and it was certainly
not the overriding state policy in 1839. Indeed, at the appellate
level of the VMI case, Judge Niemeyer noted that, if anything,
Virginia's public colleges and universities had experienced a move
away from gender diversity.21'
Judge Kiser next legitimized his expansive reading of diversity
through a reference to educational experts. The only conclusive
point he made, however, was that a healthy pedagogical debate
existed regarding the "wisdom of maintaining 'single-sex' insti-
tutions of higher education."2 12 Judge Kiser recognized the debate
in the Williams case, which he nevertheless used to support his
expansive definition of diversity.213 In the VMI decision, Judge
Kiser relied on expert testimony and one empirical study to
prove his point that VMI would be irreparably harmed if it
opened its doors to women.21 4 The testimony and study, however,
agree only that "some students, both male and female, benefit
from attending a single-sex college."215
Though Judge Kiser's district court opinion is now of no
precedential value, the harm done was that it legitimized an
expansive reading of diversity without careful inquiry. In Bakke,
diversity was limited to geographic and ethnic considerations
within a single graduate program.2P18 Conceding for a moment
that diversity has broader applications than originally defined in
210. See Robert N. Davis, The Quest for Equal Education in Mississippi: The Implications
of United States v. Fordice, 62 U. Miss. L.J. 405, 415 (1993).
211. Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d at 899.
212. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. at 1410 (citing Williams v. McNair, 316 F.
Supp. 134, 137 (1970)).
213. See id. at 1411-13.
214. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. at 1412-13.
215. Id. at 1411-12.
216. See discussion supra part I.C.; see also Cheh, supra note 185, at 60. Professor
Cheh writes:
Diversity was first used as a compelling justification to include minority
racial groups in schools where their numbers were scant or nonexistent....
[T]he overall objective was diversity of the student body as a whole, as a
means of enriching the educational experience for everyone.
... In contrast, diversity in the VMI context is a reason to exclude, or to
isolate and separate constituent groups.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Bakke, the real struggle is in the constitutional implementation
of a government policy that describes classifications that discrim-
inate as legitimate. If the government interest is legitimate, as
it may be with diversity, then implementation of such policies
necessarily leads one down the road of separate facilities, or at
least separate educational opportunities, in the name of diversity.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist raised the banner of educational
diversity in the dissent in Hogan and now Judge Kiser has carried
that banner held high through his district court and has passed
it along to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Though the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district
court opinion, 217 it accepted the district court's factual conclusion
that "if VMI became coeducational, it would offer 'neither males
nor females the VMI education that now exists."' 218 The Fourth
Circuit held that the lower court's conclusions were supported
in three respects: "physical training, the absence of privacy, and
the adversative approach. '21 9 The court held:
The district court's conclusions that VMI's mission can be
accomplished only in a single-gender environment and that
changes necessary to accommodate coeducation would tear at
the fabric of VMI's unique methodology are adequately sup-
ported. And the district court was not clearly erroneous in
concluding that if a court were to require the admission of
women to VMI to give them access to this unique methodology,
the decision would deny those women the very opportunity
they sought because the unique characteristics of VMI's pro-
gram would be destroyed by coeducation. The Catch-22 is that
women are denied the opportunity when excluded from VMI
and cannot be given the opportunity by admitting them, be-
cause the change caused by their admission would destroy the
opportunity. 0
The Fourth Circuit thus accepted Virginia's diversity argument
as a persuasive and legitimate goal. 221 However, the court re-
manded the case to the lower court in order to address the issue
of "why the Commonwealth of Virginia offers the opportunity
217. United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
218. Id. at 896 (quoting Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. at 1407).
219. Id. at 896-97.
220. Id. at 897 (citation omitted).
221. See id. at 898.
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only to men."222 The unanswered question remains why the State
offers VMI's unique education and training to men and not
women.m The circuit court held:
If VMI's male-only admissions policy is in furtherance of a
state policy of "diversity," the explanation of how the policy
is furthered by affording a unique educational benefit only to
males is lacking. A policy of diversity which aims to provide
an array of educational opportunities, including single-gender
institutions, must do more than favor one gender.2 4
Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the State had adequately
defended VMI's program to produce citizen soldiers, but Virginia
needed to explain how it was advancing the governmental objec-
tive of educational diversity by maintaining one single-sex insti-
tution.2
The Fourth Circuit thereby embraced the expanded definition
of diversity and, in the name of diversity, pushed open the door
to the passage toward separate but equal. The Fourth Circuit
emphasized that it had indeed chosen to travel down this path
toward separate but equal when it recommended that "the Com-
monwealth might properly decide to admit women to VMI and
adjust the program to implement that choice, or it might establish
parallel institutions or parallel programs, or it might abandon
state support of VMI, leaving VMI the option to pursue its own
policies as a private institution. ' 26
The Fourth Circuit made it clear that the governmental goal
of educational diversity was not met through the VMI example
standing alone. In addition to suggesting that VMI could admit
women, the court offered another option-a parallel institution
for women. It is precisely this kind of open door to the past of
separate but equal that is cause for concern. Diversity has been
a laudable goal, but it could lead to a path of duplicated programs,
duplicated facilities, and fiscal drain on public expenditures. The
Fourth Circuit glossed over the diversity issue and instead ac-
cepted unexamined conclusions regarding its legitimacy in this
context as a state interest. Perhaps diversity is a legitimate state
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 899
225. Id.
226. Id. at 900.
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interest, but the court should have demonstrated that through a
close examination of the issues.
Did VMI offer its unique brand of single-sex education in the
interest of diversity? I don't think so-the real reason was
tradition. Yet the Fourth Circuit in its phrasing of the central
issues focused on the lack of an all-female military school rather
than the larger question of whether Virginia afforded women
equal educational opportunities.2 Thus, I think the focus of the
Fourth Circuit's inquiry was misplaced.
In April 1994, Judge Kiser issued his memorandum opinion in
the VMI case on remand from the Fourth Circuit and concluded
that the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) pro-
gram at Mary Baldwin College met the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause.2 The overarching question was what did the
"Fourth Circuit's opinion require of a proposed plan in order to
pass constitutional muster?" The United States argued that to
comply with the Fourth Circuit's opinion the Commonwealth was
required to provide a VMI type of education.3 0 The Common-
wealth argued that compliance with the Fourth Circuit's mandate
could be achieved through developing an all-female college pro-
gram comparable to VMI but not necessarily identical.P1
Judge Kiser was persuaded by the Commonwealth's argu-
ments. He saw the VWIL plan as one that would take into
account "the differences and the needs of college-age men and
women."23 2 The adversative method was replaced with a cooper-
ative method "which reinforces self-esteem rather than the lev-
eling process used by VMI."'  Judge Kiser noted that:
VWIL will be a highly structured program but without the
extreme adversative VMI components, such as the rat line and
breakout. In the opinion of one of the leading experts on the
educating of women, Dr. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, an adversa-
tive method of teaching in an all-female school would be not
227. Allan Ides, The Curious Case of the Virginia Military Institute: An Essay on the
Judicial Function, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35. 45 (1993). Professor Ides similarly argues
that "in the context of the VMI case, the question is not whether the state provides an
all-female version of VMI, but whether the Commonwealth provides equivalent opportu-
nities in higher education for women." Id.
228. See United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994).
229. Id. at 474.
230. Id. at 475.
231. Id. at 472.
232. Id. at 476.
233. Id.
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only inappropriate for most women, but counter-productive.M
Judge Kiser's opinion also detailed some of the differences be-
tween the VWIL and VMI educational models in areas of aca-
demic offerings, residence life, military component, overall benefits
and outcomes, and pedagogical justifications. He noted that "[t]he
very concept of diversity precludes the Commonwealth from
offering an identical curriculum at each of its colleges."sis He
concluded that:
iT]he differences between VWIL and VMI are justified peda-
gogically and are not based on stereotyping. This is not to say
that some women cannot succeed within a VMI type method-
ology. The evidence at trial indicated that the VMI methodol-
ogy could be used to educate women and, in fact, some women-
such as the allegorical Jackie Jones-may prefer the VMI
methodology to the VWIL methodology. As discussed above,
however, the controlling legal principles in this case do not
require the Commonwealth to provide a mirror image VMI for
women. Rather, it is sufficient that the Commonwealth provide
an all-female program that will achieve substantially similar
outcomes in an all-female environment and that there is a
legitimate pedagogical basis for the different means employed
to achieve the substantially similar ends. VWIL satisfies the
Fourth Circuit's requirement that the Commonwealth adopt a
parallel program for women which takes into account the
differences and needs of each sex.P6
Judge Kiser's memorandum opinion has been appealed to the
Fourth Circuit for a determination on whether the instructions
of the court of appeals were followed. Ultimate resolution of this
issue may well rest with the Supreme Court, but whether or not
Judge Kiser properly interpreted the Fourth Circuit's instruc-
tions, the harm has already been done. The court of appeals, in
the name of diversity, has suggested that a parallel single-sex
institution might satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. The Fourth
Circuit, in the name of diversity, has taken another step down
the road toward a modern separate but equal doctrine.2 7
234. Id.
235. Id. at 477.
236. Id. at 481. This decision is currently on appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
237. See Grace W. Tsuang, Assuring Equal Access of Asian Americans to Highly Selective
Universities, 98 YALE L.J. 659 (1989). For a thorough discussion of how this expanded
view of unexamined diversity can lead to other forms of mischief, such as separate but
equal racial or ethnic schools, see generally Cheh, supra note 185.
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B. Faulkner v. Jones
The Fourth Circuit added little clarity to its diversity analysis
in Faulker v. Jones.2 In Faulkner, The Citadel, a public all-male
college in South Carolina, admitted Shannon R. Faulkner, but
withdrew her admission when the school discovered that Shannon
was female.239 The district court granted a preliminary injunction
to Ms. Faulkner and required The Citadel to allow her to attend
day classes pending resolution of her equal protection claim on
the merits. In a case factually almost identical to the VMI case,
the Fourth Circuit held:
In this case, ordering Faulkner to day classes will probably
shake The Citadel's stability temporarily. However, the prelim-
inary injunction will not change or destroy any material aspect
of The Citadel's program. Moreover, no temporary adverse
impact would be irreversible for The Citadel. Denying Faulk-
ner's access, on the other hand, might likely become permanent
for her, due to the extended time necessary to complete the
litigation. The most telling aspect of this case, and that which
distinguishes this case from VMI, is the presence of this time
pressure, combined with an absence of present opportunity for
Faulkner.
South Carolina is not prepared to provide an alternative
remedy to Faulkner at this time, and it has not suggested one.
Any alternative would have to await the results of the state
committee's study, a court review of the committee's report,
and implementation. In the meantime, current state policy
denies Faulkner any relief to which she probably would be
entitled in the long run, whether by attendance at The Citadel
or at some other institution. Under these circumstances, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
entering the preliminary injunction for the limited, but tem-
porary relief.20
The Fourth Circuit justified its decision in Faulkner by concluding
that Ms. Faulkner would suffer irreparable harm if not allowed
to enroll in day classes, but The Citadel would not suffer com-
parable harm.24'
238. 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), mnotion to stay denied, 14 F.3d 3 (4th Cir. 1994).
239. Faulkner 10 F.3d at 228.
240. Id. at 233.
241. Id at 233. In his dissent, Judge Hamilton disagreed that Ms. Faulkner would
suffer irreparable harm and further argued that The Citadel would suffer such harm by
her admission. Id. at 234 (Hamilton. J., dissenting).
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In the VMI case, the Fourth Circuit accepted the lower court's
findings "which recognized physical and psychological differences
between men and women."2 42 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
admitting women to VMI would require the school to develop a
dual tracking program for training men and women. 43 Thus, in
the VMI case the court concluded that admitting women would
fundamentally change VMI's military program and effectively
end its uniqueness. 4  This, the court said, distinguishes The
Citadel case from the VMI case. Such a distinction is quite elusive.
It appears that the Fourth Circuit now may be on the right
constitutional track in Faulkner, but it is unwilling to admit that
its analysis was incomplete in the VMI case.
C. Single-Race Institutions in the Name of Diversity
In 1992, the Supreme Court held open the separate but equal
door in United States v. Fordice.A5 In Fordice, black students in
Mississippi filed a lawsuit alleging that the state maintained a
dual system of higher education because most black students
attended historically black colleges and most white students
attended historically white colleges.216 The plaintiffs argued that
Mississippi's higher education system violated both the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 The State responded that it had
achieved full compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VI by adopting race-neutral policies, and that the choices
students made were individual choices.2 "
The Supreme Court held:
If the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its
prior system that continue to have segregative effects-whether
242. Id. at 231 (citing United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d 890, 896 (4th
Cir. 1992). cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993)).
243. Id. (citing to Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d at 896).
244. Id. (citing to Commonwealth of Va., 976 F.2d at 897).
245. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). In another context, the Supreme Court engaged in diversity
policy making with a prospective focus. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990) (addressing challenges to two Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
policies, one involving enhancement for minority ownership in granting new licenses and
the other challenging the minority distress sale program). The Court held that '[the
Commission's minority ownership policies bear the imprimatur of long standing congres-
sional support and direction and are substantially related to the achievement of the
important governmental objective of broadcast diversity." Id. at 600.
246. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2733.
247. Davis, supra note 210, at 414 (citing Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2733).
248. Id. (citing to Petitioner's Brief at 1, Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (No. 90-6588)).
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by influencing student enrollment decisions or by fostering
segregation in other facets of the university system-and such
policies are without sound educational justification and can be
practicably eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden
of proving that it has dismantled its prior system.49
The Court concluded that had the lower courts applied this
standard, their analyses would have revealed several surviving
aspects of Mississippi's prior dual system that were constitution-
ally suspect.20 That is, even though such policies may be race-
neutral on their face, they substantially restrict a person's choice
of institution and they contribute to the racial identifiability of
the eight public universities. 251
The Court identified four current policies traceable to a prior
de jure system: admission standards, program duplication, insti-
tutional mission assignments, and the continued operation of all
eight public universities.22 The fourth policy is relevant to the
diversity debate. Although the Supreme Court strongly encour-
aged the district court to review the viability of maintaining
eight publicly supported universities, it left open the possibility
that the state could justify the continued existence of eight
schools if it eliminated program duplication.m
The Court recognized that a larger rather than a smaller
number of schools offered students more choices among institu-
tions and that if the state closed one or more institutions, this
would decrease the discriminatory effects of the past system.
Even based on the circumstances surrounding this case, however,
the Court was not willing to order closure or merger.2 Based
on the record, the Court could not determine whether the Con-
249. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2737.
250. Id. at 2738.
251. Id.
252. Id. For a careful and detailed discussion of Fordice, see Davis, supra note 210
(urging Mississippi to develop a single university system that will provide quality
education to all Mississippi residents); see also Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness
in Higher Education: Does "Sound Educational Policy" Support the Continued Existence
of Historically Black Colleges?, 43 EmoRY L.J. 1 (1994) (exploring reasons why sound
educational policy allows for the continued operation of historically black colleges); Alex
M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails
African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1401 (1993) (arguing that the ideal integrated
society can be achieved only through a transitional stage in which racial differences are
truly respected, a stage that requires the public maintenance of and support for predom-
inantly black colleges).
253. For an excellent discussion regarding educational justifications for historically
black colleges, see Brown-Scott, supra note 252.
254. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2742-43.
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stitution required closure of one or more schools.25 The Court
speculated that the State could possibly cure the constitutional
violation by eliminating program duplication and changing mis-
sion and admission requirements.2 6 The Court held:
[O]n remand this issue should be carefully explored by inquiring
and determining whether retention of all eight institutions
itself affects student choice and perpetuates the segregated
higher education system, whether maintenance of each of the
universities is educationally justifiable, and whether one or
more of them can be practicably closed or merged with other
existing institutions.27
Thus, the Court left the door open for the state to provide
educational justifications for maintaining these eight institu-
tions.m
Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, became one of the
Court's advocates for allowing states to offer sound educational
justification for maintaining their historically black schools. 2 9 He
noted that the Court did "not foreclose the possibility that there
exists 'sound educational justification' for maintaining historically
black colleges as such."26' Justice Thomas next set forth an
argument based on diversity:
Obviously, a State cannot maintain such traditions by closing
particular institutions, historically white or historically black,
to particular racial groups. Nonetheless, it hardly follows that
a State cannot operate a diverse assortment of institutions-
including historically black institutions -open to all on a race
neutral basis, but with established traditions and programs
that might disproportionately appeal to one race or another.
No one, I imagine, would argue that such institutional diversity
is without "sound educational justification .... 261
Justice Thomas applied the now expanded diversity argument
and concluded that although a state is not constitutionally re-
quired to maintain historically black schools, he did "not under-
255. Id. at 2743.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. For a discussion regarding the education of African Americans at historically
black colleges, see Brown-Scott, supra note 252.
259. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2746 (Thomas, XI., concurring and dissenting).
260. Id.
261. Id.
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stand our opinion to hold that a State is forbidden from doing
so. It would be ironic, to say the least, if the institutions that
sustained blacks during segregation were themselves destroyed
in an effort to combat its vestiges."2 2 Although the Court did
not promote the maintenance of such parallel institutions, it has
not closed the door to this option, and it has flagged diversity
as a noble goal without careful examination.
The Court did address the plaintiffs' arguments regarding
additional funding for historically black institutions (HBIs). The
Court held:
If we understand private petitioners to press us to order
the upgrading of Jackson State, Alcorn State, and Mississippi
Valley solely so that they may be publicly financed, exclusively
black enclaves by private choice, we reject that request. The
State provides these facilities for all its citizens and it has not
met its burden under Brown to take affirmative steps to
dismantle its prior de jure system when it perpetuates a
separate, but "more equal" one .... 23
In light of the Court's earlier pronouncement regarding an edu-
cational justification for maintaining eight universities, 2 4 this
passage is perplexing. These views can be reconciled by under-
standing the Court to say that it will not condone exclusive
admission policies for black students at HBIs. Justice Thomas
added that these institutions could constitutionally maintain their
identity through private choice.265 The Court's premise was that
these institutions are single race today largely because of a prior
structure that has influenced choice. 26 6 If these institutions main-
tain this racial identifiability through private choice rather than
restrictive admissions policies, then, according to Justice Thomas,
the Court may allow a state to justify public financial assis-
tance.267
But suppose the State removes all of the vestiges of the prior
de jure system and still chooses to maintain historically black
colleges as just that - historically black - now by private choice. 268
262. Id.
263. Id. at 2743.
264. Id. at 2737, 2743.
265. See i& at 2746 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
266. Id at 2743.
267. See id. at 2746 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
268. Indeed, this seems to be the direction in which the Court was going in recent
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Could the State justify these educational institutions also in the
name of diversity?
In Fordice the Court implies that it is disinclined to legitimize
the constitutional viability of single-race publicly financed insti-
tutions, but nevertheless leaves the door open for them. Although
classifications based on race and sex do not receive the same
constitutional scrutiny,8 9 to allow or indeed promote single-sex
institutions in the name of diversity seems antithetical to the
Court's "reluctance" to allow single-race institutions.270 Although
in Fordice the existence of single-race institutions had historical
origins, the modern justifications for single-race schools are iden-
tical to those that states have offered for single-sex institutions.
States allege that HBIs provide a nurturing environment for
black students, black students do not feel intimidated or over-
looked in the classroom, and they are able to participate more
in class and develop better self-confidence than at historically
white institutions.271 Additionally, proponents of HBIs contend
decisions like Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (holding that where existing
residential segregation results from demographic changes, private decision making, and
economics, and the school board can demonstrate that it complies with a prior desegre-
gation decree in good faith, the district court may dissolve an injunctive decree); see also
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (holding that where demographic changes continue
to create racial imbalance and the school district has a history of good faith compliance
with a desegregation order, a district court may relinquish supervision and control of a
school district in incremental stages before full compliance has been achieved in every
area of school operations); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (holding that although
redistricting may be race-neutral on its face, if district lines are drawn such that the
legislation cannot be understood as anything other than an attempt to separate votes
along racial lines, a claim is made under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
269. See supra notes 65, 197-99 and accompanying text.
270. Consider, however, the arguments made by some proponents of inner city single-
race and single-sex schools. Many of these educators justify single-sex schools because of
the endangered position of black males in society. These educators maintain that African
American boys have unique problems and the single-sex schools are designed specifically
to address those problems. Among the problems listed are discipline, lack of role models,
violence, and social pressure. For a discussion of the constitutionality of single-race and
single-sex schools see Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The
Paradozes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L.
REV. 813 (1993); Richard Cummings, All-Male Black Schools: Equal Protection, the New
Separatism and Brown v. Board of Education, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725 (1993); Michael
John Weber, Immersed in Educational Crisis: Alternative Program for African-American
Males, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1099 (1993); Note, Inner-City Single-Sex Schools: Educational
Reform or Intidious Discrimination?, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1741 (1992). But see Helaine
Greenfield, Some Constitutional Problems with the Resegregation of Public Schools, 80 GEO.
L.J. 363 (1991) (discussing constitutional problems with single-race schools).
271. See generally Pamela J. Smith, All-Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection
Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REV. 2004 (1992) (discussing benefits
of all-male black schools).
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that the present condition of African Americans both in educa-
tional institutions and in society at large may provide the com-
pelling interest necessary to pass constitutional requirements. 2
Moreover, if the present undifferentiated notion that diversity
justifies separateness continues, it is possible that the parties in
the ongoing litigation of Fordice will justify racially identifiable
institutions in the name of diversity. Very simply stated, the
courts have failed to analyze critically the claims of diversity
and, as a result, diversity is now an empty concept. It can be
used both to include and to exclude.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have used the cases cited for two points. First, diversity has
evolved from its original meaning in DeFunis273 and Bakke 4 of
individual ethnic and geographic diversity. As evidenced by the
VMI case,25 Faulkner,2 6 and Fordice,17 courts have expanded the
meaning of diversity to include educational institutions with
different missions, programs, and admission requirements. Sec-
ond, what troubles me most about the evolution of diversity is
not so much that its meaning has changed as society has evolved,
but that this evolution occurred in an unprincipled fashion with-
out explanation as to whether the articulated benefits allegedly
derived were consistent with diversity as we had come to un-
derstand it. None would argue the importance of diversity to our
society, but the change in the use of diversity was not a change
accompanied by any explanation or justification. It was ushered
in with a dissent in Hogan278 and courts have subsequently used
it to justify the existence of VMI, a single-sex institution in
Lexington, Virginia.' 9
Moreover, by using diversity in such an unprincipled fashion,
the courts have arguably encouraged-but at a minimum con-
doned-the justification of publicly supported schools that are
single sex, single race, single religion, single age, or some other
272. Brown, supra note 270, at 874-76.
273. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
274. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
275. United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated,
976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992). cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
276. Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993), motion to stay denied, 14 F.3d 3
(4th Cir. 1994).
277. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
278. 458 U.S. 718 (1992).
279. Commonwealth of Va., 766 F. Supp. at 1409.
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restrictive classification in the name of diversity. Maybe the
Court will ultimately find certain justifications for such institu-
tions substantial enough to pass the constitutional heightened
scrutiny requirements. But the justifications offered in the opi-
nions on which I have focused describe only a pedagogical debate
and supportive studies suggesting that there may be benefits
associated with all-boys and all-girls schools. Is it on this kind of
evidence that we will rest judicial decisions that encourage the
creation of publicly supported parallel institutions like that of
VWIL at Mary Baldwin College in Staunton, Virginia?280
My objection at this point is not so much that single-interest
institutions should not be publicly supported -though I do believe
that our public institutions should be broadly available to eve-
ryone-but that the judiciary has in one fell swoop changed the
meaning of diversity and legitimated its expanded application
with neither a fair discussion of educational policy nor consider-
ation of whether promoting parallel institutions passes constitu-
tional muster. On this note, I submit that the Court should be
more circumspect regarding the direction in which such cavalier
decision making leads.
As Arthur Schlesinger stated:
[Piressed too far, the cult of ethnicity has had bad consequences
too. The new ethnic gospel rejects the unifying vision of
individuals from all nations melted into a new race. Its under-
lying philosophy is that America is not a nation of individuals
at all but a nation of groups, that ethnicity is the defining
experience for iiiost Americans, that ethnic ties are permanent
and indelible, and that division into ethnic communities estab-
lishes the basic structure of American society and the basic
meaning of American history.
Implicit in this philosophy is the classification of all Ameri-
cans according to ethnic and racial criteria. But while the
ethnic interpretation of American history, like the economic
interpretation, is valid and illuminating up to a point, it is
fatally misleading and wrong when presented as the whole
picture. The ethnic interpretation, moreover, reverses the his-
toric theory of America as one people-the theory that has
thus far managed to keep American society whole.
Instead of a transformative nation with an identity all its
own, America in this new light is seen as preservative of
diverse alien identities. Instead of a nation composed of indi-
280. United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 852 F. Supp. 471, 481 (W. D. Va. 1994).
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viduals making their own unhampered choices, America in-
creasingly sees itself as composed of groups more or less
ineradicable in their ethnic character. The multiethnic dogma
abandons historic purposes, replacing assimilation by fragmen-
tation, integration by separatism.
It belittles unum and glorifies pluribus.2'
In his book, Belonging to Amer ca,2 Kenneth Karst has cap-
tured the problems I have discussed. Professor Karst makes the
point that in America, the dominant group has used the law as
an instrument to assert its dominance.m The conclusion I draw
from this is that identification with separate groups to the ex-
clusion of recognizing a national commonality is not desirable in
the long-run. This so-called separatist movement, be it racial,
ethnic, gender, or religious, is the reaction of some groups to not
being accepted equally as part of the dominant mainstream cul-
ture. These groups have been viewed as the "other" rather than
the "us." The group identification movement, which may be
taking us down a separate but equal path, should be countered
by the use of law as an instrument for inclusion rather than
exclusion.
281. SCHLESINGER, supro. note 1 at 16-17.
282. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989).
283. Id. at 24.
